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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 11-3029 
_____________ 
 
In re:  VICTOR MONDELLI, 
Debtor 
 
VICTOR MONDELLI, 
ANNA MONDELLI and 
KENNETH ROSELLINI, ESQ., 
Appellants                                        
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-03393) 
District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 13, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed December 26, 2012)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant/Debtor Victor Mondelli and Appellant Anna Mondelli, a purported 
intervenor, appeal the District Court’s dismissal of their appeals of eleven bankruptcy 
orders and the District Court’s denial of their motion for reconsideration.  In addition, 
Kenneth Rosellini, the Mondellis’ lawyer, appeals the District Court’s imposition of Rule 
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11 sanctions against him and the District Court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration.  
For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm.  
I. 
 Mondelli filed for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on February 18, 
2004.  He later requested that the case be dismissed.  The Chapter 13 Trustee suggested 
that, as an alternative to dismissal, the case be converted to Chapter 7, and instructed 
Mondelli to attend a hearing on the possible conversion.  Neither Mondelli nor his lawyer 
attended.  On October 21, 2004, the Bankruptcy Court converted the case to Chapter 7, 
and on February 7, 2005, for reasons not related to this appeal, the Bankruptcy Court 
reconverted the case to Chapter 13.  The Bankruptcy Court amended its February 7, 2005 
Order on February 15, 2005, and the Chapter 13 Plan was ultimately confirmed on 
February 3, 2006.  On February 21, 2007, the Bankruptcy Court vacated the February 7, 
2005 Order and converted the case back to Chapter 7.  The Mondellis now appeal the 
February 7, 2005 and February 15, 2005 Orders for the first time.   
 In orders dated April 6, 2005 and April 20, 2005, the Bankruptcy Court granted 
compensation to the Chapter 7 Trustee.  The Mondellis now appeal these orders for the 
first time.   
 On May 15, 2007, the Bankruptcy Court entered a consent order, agreed to by 
Mondelli, authorizing Mondelli to obtain a loan from Jack Silverman Realty & Mortgage 
Co. (“JSRM”).  On May 16, 2007, the Bankruptcy Court entered a related consent order, 
agreed to by Mondelli, which authorized Mondelli to lease property to Berkeley Realty 
Partners 224, LLC (“Berkeley”).  On June 27, 2007, the Bankruptcy Court entered 
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another consent order, which Mondelli again agreed to, authorizing Mondelli to lease an 
additional property to Berkeley.  None of the consent orders included provisions that 
authorized a party to appeal the order, and Mondelli was represented by counsel when he 
agreed to all three consent orders.  On November 19, 2007, the Bankruptcy Court entered 
an order enforcing the consent orders.  In re Victor Mondelli, No. 04-15268 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. Nov. 19, 2007).  Mondelli filed a motion for reconsideration, which the 
Bankruptcy Court denied.  Mondelli appealed this ruling to the District Court, which 
dismissed Mondelli’s appeal for failure to comply with Rule 8006 of the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure.  Mondelli v. Berkeley Realty Partners # 244, LLC, 2008 WL 
3843268 (D.N.J. Aug. 14, 2008).  On further appeal, we then affirmed.  In re Mondelli, 
349 Fed. App’x. 731 (3d Cir. 2009).  
 On October 17, 2007 and May 7, 2008, the Bankruptcy Court entered orders 
granting attorneys fees to the Chapter 7 Trustee.  On January 7, 2009, the Bankruptcy 
Court entered an order approving the “third and final application” for fees.  On January 
20, 2009, Mondelli filed a notice of appeal to the District Court of the October 17, 2007, 
May 7, 2008, and January 7, 2009 Orders.  He thereafter failed to prosecute these 
appeals.  The Mondellis now appeal these orders to this Court.  On October 21, 2009, the 
Bankruptcy Court entered an order granting the Trustee fees and expenses.  The 
Mondellis now appeal this order for the first time. 
 On March 15, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Final Decree.  On March 29, 
2010, the Mondellis filed a notice of appeal to the District Court, indicating their intent to 
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appeal eleven orders.  As described in the Mondellis’ notice of appeal, these orders 
include:  
 February 7, 2005 Order Converting Case to Chapter 13; 
 February 15, 2005 Amendment to Order Converting Case to Chapter 13; 
 April 6, 2005 Order Granting Compensation to Trustee; 
 April 20, 2005 Order Granting Compensation to Trustee; 
 May 15, 2007 Consent Order Authorizing Ground Lease; 
 May 16, 2007 Consent Order Authorizing Debtor to Enter into a Ground 
Lease;
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 October 17, 2007 Order Granting Attorneys Fees for Trustee; 
 May 7, 2008 Order Granting Attorneys Fees for Trustee; 
 January 7, 2009 Order Granting Attorneys Fees for Trustee;  
 October 21, 2009 Order Granting Trustee Fees and Expenses; and 
 March 15, 2010 Final Decree.  
In connection with the appeal of the May 15, 2007 and May 16, 2007 consent 
orders, JSRM and Berkeley (the “Rule 11 Movants”) moved for Rule 11 sanctions 
against the Mondellis’ attorney, Kenneth Rosellini, and Hallock and Cammarota, LLP, 
the law firm where Rosellini was “Of Counsel” (“Rule 11 Defendants”).  JSRM and 
Berkeley did not serve the Rule 11 Defendants with a copy of the Rule 11 motion that 
they intended to file.  Rather, JSRM and Berkeley sent the Rule 11 Defendants a letter 
that outlined some of their reasons as to why Rule 11 sanctions were warranted.     
The District Court dismissed all of the appeals, reasoning that the Mondellis did 
not have standing to appeal the Final Decree, and that their appeals of the other ten other 
orders was untimely.
2
  In addition, the District Court concluded that the letter JSRM and 
                                              
1
 Without explanation, the Mondellis’ brief substitutes the June 27, 2007 consent order for 
the May 16, 2007 consent order.  We will consider the Mondellis as having appealed both 
decisions.      
 
2
 This opinion will refer to these ten orders as the “Orders.” 
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Berkeley sent to the Rule 11 Defendants substantially complied with Rule 11’s safe-
harbor provision, and granted sanctions against both Rosellini and Hallock and 
Cammarota, LLP (the “Rule 11 Order”).  The District Court, however, limited the basis 
of the sanctions to the allegations set forth in the letter.  
The Mondellis filed a motion for reconsideration, and in response, the Rule 11 
Movants moved for additional Rule 11 sanctions.  In addition, Rosellini filed a motion for 
reconsideration of the Rule 11 Order.  The District Court denied both motions for 
reconsideration and the subsequent motion for sanctions.   
The Mondellis now appeal the dismissal of all of their appeals to this Court.  In 
addition, Rosellini appeals the imposition of sanctions.   
II. 
a. The Bankruptcy Orders 
On appeals from the District Court’s review of bankruptcy matters, we review 
findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard and exercise plenary review over 
questions of law.  In re Dykes, 10 F.3d 184, 185-86 (3d Cir. 1993).   
The Mondellis raise two arguments as to why this Court should reverse the 
District Court’s dismissal of their appeals of eleven bankruptcy orders.  First, the 
Mondellis argue that the Bankruptcy Court erred in converting Mondelli’s case to 
Chapter 7 instead of dismissing it as he requested in 2004.
3
  The Mondellis, who do not 
                                              
3
 Although irrelevant to our decision, we note that Mondelli never filed a motion to 
dismiss the Chapter 13 case nor did he file a motion opposing the conversion of his case 
to Chapter 7.  In addition, Mondelli’s motion to reconvert his case to Chapter 13, (A-
885), makes no contention that the District Court erred in converting the case to Chapter 
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contend that their appeals of the Orders were timely, appear to suggest that this error 
absolves them of having to have raised timely appeals.  Second, the Mondellis argue that 
because the Bankruptcy Court never issued an order approving the Trustee’s Final 
Report, they should be allowed to appeal the Final Decree.  Neither of these arguments 
has merit.   
i. The Orders 
A party has fourteen days from the date of the entry of the judgment to file a 
notice of appeal.  Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a).  This deadline is strictly construed, In re 
Universal Minerals, Inc., 755 F.2d 309, 311 (3d Cir. 1985), and a party’s failure to file a 
timely notice of appeal creates a jurisdictional defect that bars appellate review.  
S’holders v. Sound Radio, Inc., 109 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1997).  Thus, any alleged error 
by the Bankruptcy Court in converting Mondelli’s case to Chapter 7 in 2004—a decision 
that Mondelli did not appeal
4— is irrelevant in deciding whether the Mondellis’ appeals 
of the Orders should be dismissed because they were untimely.  The only inquiry is 
whether the Mondellis met the deadline, and it is clear they did not.  Although as noted, 
the Mondellis do not argue that the District Court erred in concluding that the Mondellis’ 
appeals of the Orders were untimely, we will briefly address the Orders at issue.  
                                                                                                                                                  
7—only that Mondelli “attempted to have a Voluntary Dismissal.”  As discussed supra, 
Mondelli was successful in reconverting his case to Chapter 13.  
 
4
 Mondelli appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to reconvert the case from Chapter 
13 to Chapter 7 in 2007.  The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision, 
Mondelli v. Greenberg, 2007 WL 4365310 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2007), which Mondelli did 
not appeal. 
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The Mondellis missed the deadline to appeal the February 7, 2005 and February 
15, 2005 Orders by almost four years, as these orders were final when the Chapter 13 
plan was approved on February 3, 2006.  See In re Young, 237 F.3d 1168, 1172-73 (10th 
Cir. 2001); In re Salvo, 2008 WL 938585, at *2-3 (Bankr. N.D. Oh. Apr. 4, 2008).  
Similarly, Mondelli’s appeals of the Bankruptcy Court’s April 6, 2005 Order, April 20, 
2005 Order, October 17, 2007 Order, May 7, 2008 Order, and January 7, 2009 Order, 
which granted attorneys fees to the Chapter 7 Trustee, and its October 21, 2009 Order 
that granted compensation to the Chapter 7 Trustee, are well past the fourteen day 
deadline, as these orders were final for purposes of appeal when they were entered on the 
docket.  See S’holders, 109 F.3d at 880-81.  
The Mondellis’ appeal of the May 15, 2007, May 16, 2007, and June 27, 2007 
consent orders is also untimely.  Moreover, the Mondellis are precluded from even 
appealing these orders, as they are consent judgments, see Verzilli v. Flexon, Inc., 295 
F.3d 421, 424 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining circumstances when a party can appeal a 
consent judgment), and this Court had already considered the merits of these orders in In 
re Mondelli, 349 Fed. App’x. 731 (3d Cir. 2009).  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
District Court’s dismissal of the Mondellis’ appeals of the Orders.   
ii. The Final Decree 
 Moreover, we agree with the well-reasoned analysis of the District Court that the 
Mondellis did not have standing to appeal the Final Decree.  “[O]nly those whose rights 
or interests are directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by an order of the bankruptcy 
court may bring an appeal.”  In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 249 (3d Cir. 2000) 
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(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Here, the Final Decree did nothing more 
than recognize that the estate had been fully administered and order necessary ministerial 
acts.  Indeed, the Mondellis do not even suggest that any right has been compromised by 
the Final Decree.  Thus, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the Mondellis’ 
appeal of this order.    
b. Rule 11 Sanctions 
 The parties dispute whether the Rule 11 Movants’ letter to the Rule 11 Defendants 
was procedurally defective.
5
  We agree with the District Court that the letter substantially 
complied with the safe-harbor provision in Rule 11 and that the Rule 11 Movants are 
entitled to a decision on the merits of their request for sanctions.  See Nisenbaum v. 
Milwaukee Cnty., 333 F.3d 804, 808 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding defendants substantially 
complied with safe-harbor provision by sending notification letter); Jeffreys v. Rossi, 275 
F. Supp. 2d 463, 480 n.27 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (same).   
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing 
sanctions on the Rule 11 Defendants for appealing two (or three) consent orders.  See 
Waltz v. Cnty. of Lycoming, 974 F.2d 387, 388 (3d Cir. 1992) (explaining that this Court 
reviews a district court’s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions for abuse of discretion).  A 
party cannot appeal a consent judgment unless at least one of three exceptions applies: (1) 
a party did not actually consent; (2) the court approving the consent order lacked the 
subject matter jurisdiction to enter the judgment; and (3) the consent judgment explicitly 
reserves the right to appeal.  Verzilli, 295 F.3d at 424; In re Sharon Steel Corp., 918 F.2d 
                                              
5
 The Rule 11 Defendants did not challenge the Rule 11 Movants’ motion on procedural 
grounds to the District Court.  The District Court raised the issue sua sponte.   
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434, 437 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990).  None of these exceptions apply here.  As such, we will 
affirm the District Court’s imposition of sanctions.    
III. 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court’s ruling. 
